7月6日 エジプトは90年代のアルジェリア化する？ L'Egypte suivrait l'exemple tragique de l'Algérie des années 90s ?

Le samedi 6 juillet 2013

7時半、快晴、20℃、57.5％。

エジプトで国軍が介入してモルシ大統領を追放した事件では、国軍の大衆迎合路線が確認されたといえる。しかし、国軍は本当に大衆に迎合したのか。大衆の利益を代弁しようとしたのではなく、自らの利益、国軍の利益を守っているのではないかと思われる。なぜなら、国軍がエジプト経済で占める重要さは軍の枠を超えているからである。国軍は一大財閥でもある。これはfacebook仲間である写真家・旅行家の田中真知氏のブログにも詳しく書かれていました。

http://earclean.cocolog-nifty.com/blog/2013/07/post-5fff.html

「エジプトの政変について思う」をご参照ください。

昨年2012年6月23日のBBCの記事を下に引用する。「国家の中の国家」であるエジプトの国軍組織の経済における位置がわかる。

エジプト国軍による無血クーデタは、1990年代のアルジェリアを思い起こさせる。僕は1982年にアルジェリアからスイスに移ってしまっていたが、1988年首都アルジェから始まったデモの嵐が一党独裁だった「アルジェリアの春」の引き金になった。しかし、1990年の地方選、また1991年の国会選挙で躍進したのがイスラム勢力のFISだった。身に危険を感じたのが軍であり1992年1月11日クー・デタで「民主的」プロセスを停止してしまった。それから10年間、アルジェリアの暗黒の時代が始まる。FISが地下にもぐりテロ活動に入った。非イスラムの外国人排撃は勿論、アルジェリア人の犠牲者が15万人といわれている。時々カビリ地方の警察や軍隊施設が襲われるテロが今でも続いている。

FISの台頭が軍の地益を損なうと見たから大衆に合わせて郡が動いたのである。アルジェリアは長い独立戦争を経てフランスから1962年に独立した。戦争を担ったのがFLNであり、彼らが政党も組織して独裁政治を敷いた。利権は全てFLNが握っている。その構造はいまでも変わらない。

エジプトでも軍は常に権力を握っている。英国の傀儡である君主を倒して共和制を起こしたのは軍である。その後ナセルもサダトも軍人だ。軍がエジプト経済の隅々まで根を張ったのも自然の成行きである。

果たしてエジプトの「ムスリム同胞団Frère Musulmans」がアルジェリアのFIS（武装集団としてはGIS）と同様にテロ活動に向かうのか要注意である。もしそうなったら観光不可どころの騒ぎではない。「ムスリム同胞団」をテロに向かわせない、何らかの懐柔、抱込み、あるいは妥協が必要といえるが、彼らを納得させながら無力化するのはもはや遅すぎるかもしれない。

軍部を動かしてモルシ津法で喜ぶデモ隊
（軍には逆らえないのでは？）

エジプトの臨時大統領アドリ・マンスール氏
法曹界（最高憲法院）出身
軍部および宗教界代表及び野党のエルバラダイが
選んだことになっている

Egypt's army in control of vast business empire　

By Magdi Abdelhadi

Middle East analyst

The army controls a huge business empire, covering anything from consumer goods to mining

Out in the desert to the east of the capital, Cairo, the Egyptian military has just finished building a massive new sports centre.

The resort is complete with a hotel and other facilities, including an impressive five-lane motorway, a flyover and a tunnel to ease potential traffic congestion on the way to a vast new suburb called "New Cairo", where the rich and powerful, including members of the ruling military council (Scaf), have luxurious villas.

The centrepiece is a stadium called "30 June", the date Scaf is supposed to hand over power to a civilian head of state.

The road leading up to the compound is decked with banners reading "the army and the people are one hand".

Once a popular slogan at the height of the uprising that toppled Mubarak last year, it has since been replaced with "down, down with military rule" in Tahrir Square.

The resort was built in just under two years, testimony to the army's ability to get things done quickly and effectively.

ニュー・カイロの「エジプト未来大学」の本部

Business ventures 'classified'

Protesters in Tahrir Square have been calling for the end of military rule

That is something widely acknowledged in Egypt.

Everyone says the army makes good projects for the country.

The military may be unpopular in Tahrir Square, but its approval ratings in wider society remain high - thanks in part to such infrastructure projects, but also to decades of state propaganda.

But no-one knows how the decision to turn what was once military barracks into an investment venture was taken, how much it cost to build, and who will pocket the revenues.

All that is regarded as classified - information that Egypt's top brass are determined to keep away from public scrutiny under any future government.

This is typical of the many projects built and run by the army's vast business empire, which includes manufacturing of consumer goods, food, mineral water, construction, mining, land reclamation, even tourism.

State within a state

As the debate over the role of the military in post-Mubarak Egypt intensified, General Mahmoud Nasr, the assistant defence minister, told a press conference in Cairo last year that the army would never hand over control of these projects to any other authority, adding that these were not state assets but were "revenues from the sweat of the ministry of defences and its own projects".

At around the same period it was announced that the army had come to the rescue of the ministry of finance by lending the state a substantial amount of money to shore up its rapidly-depleting coffers.

This sums up how the Egyptian military operates like a state within the state.

Estimates vary as to the size of their industries - they account for around 8%-40% of Egypt's gross national product.

But since all the military's accounts are kept secret no one knows for sure.

Moreover, the military's influence extends far beyond its own institutions.

21st Century 'left behind'

More than a year since President Hosni Mubarak was toppled, the military still holds great power

The majority of Egypt's regional governors are retired army officers.

Many of the big civilian institutions and public sector corporations are run by former generals.

The country's three main land-developing authorities (agricultural, urban and tourism) are headed by former military officers who, in addition to their pensions, receive lucrative salaries and perks associated with their civilian jobs.

The generals clearly like their privileges. But there's another rationale to them being in business, one that goes beyond their individual choices.

An academic who recently visited one of the military industrial complexes (which incidentally produces mainly civilian goods) made a very pertinent observation.

"Upon arrival," she writes, "we felt as if we had suddenly left behind the Cairo of the 21st Century, crowded with all the billboards and shops of globalisation, and walked back to the Cairo of the Nasser era during the middle of the past century."

That is the time when Egypt looked up to Soviet-style socialism, where the public sector was supposed to be in charge of the big infrastructural projects and was leading the modernisation and industrialisation effort of the state.

This kind of "socialism" ("state capitalism" is a more adequate term) is still popular in Egypt, especially among nationalists and Nasserists (followers of late president Nasser), whose candidate came third in the presidential election.

Any attempt to open up, let alone privatise, the military's business empire will face stiff resistance, not just from the generals but also from powerful allies within the state bureaucracy; people who, besides benefiting personally from the status quo, are often by their very nature hostile to change.